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SELLING NEBRASKA'S WATER: 
WATER SALES, TRANSFERS 
AND EXPORTS 
-
]. David Aiken 
Historically, western states have been free to prohibit water exports, and most 
states have done so. This changed abruptly in 1982, when the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
Sporhase decision invalidated Nebraska's groundwater export statute. After Sporhase, 
states could no longer simply prohibit the export of water, so the likelihood that water 
could be purchased or appropriated for export increased. In 1987 legislation was intro-
duced to aggressively seek interstate buyers for Nebraska water. In the face of stormy 
opposition, the legislation was successfully recast as a study of water exports and trans-
fers. The water exports study, however, contained the original premise: that selling 
Nebraska water is inevitable and could be a state financial bonanza. Analysis of the 
issue indicates it is not clear that selling Nebraska water is in the state's best interests, 
particularly if the sale proceeds are used to construct new irrigation projects, thus 
adding to surplus crop production. 
Introduction 
4 
Traditionally, western states, including Nebraska, have been able to 
prevent export of their water to other states, reserving it for in-state uses. In 
1982 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Nebraska v. 
Sporhase, invalidated a feature of Nebraska's groundwater export statute 
which discriminated against out-of-state users. The Sporhase decision 
increased the likelihood for development of increased water exports between 
states and interstate sale of water rights. Some Nebraskans see the Sporhase 
decision as an economic development opportunity, while others see it as a 
threat to the state's long-term interests. This issue is complex and contro-
versial, and Nebraska's policy response to the Sporhase decision must take 
both factors into consideration. 
This chapter examines Nebraska water policy regarding water transfers 
and exports as well as the policies of western states in general prior to the 
Sporhase dccision. The Sporhase decision is examined in some detail, as is 
water export litigation after Sporhase. The Nebraska policy response to 
Sporhase - a preview of the political controversy that will attend water 
export and transfer legislative debates in 1989 and beyond - is also profiled. 
Finally, water export and transfer policy alternatives are evaluated. 
While the thought of exporting water may strike most Nebraska citizens 
as outrageous, many small-scale transfers could occur with little adverse 
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effect on Nebraska. The likelihood of Los Angeles, Phoenix or Denver 
importing massive amounts of water from Nebraska is remote, at least within 
the foreseeable future. If water exports occur they will most likely inVolve 
small quantities moved over short distances. 
Making water rights marketable will not signal the end 
of irrigated agriculture in Nebraska; in fact it may provide 
new opportunities to resolve a variety of water conflicts. 
The notion of buying and selling water rights has always aroused contro_ 
versy in Nebraska, raising the specter of cities and industries drying up the 
irrigated areas of the state. But, in fact, allowing water rights to be purchased 
would broaden the water management options available to Nebraska 
resource managers, and could even result in enhanced protection of fish and 
wildlife. Even if municipal and industrial uses were doubled in Nebraska, the 
water could be supplied with about ten percent of the water currently used in 
irrigation. Making water rights marketable will not signal the end of irrigated 
agriculture in Nebraska; in fact it may provide new opportunities to resolve a 
variety of water conflicts. 
In considering water export policy alternatives, one must realize that the 
Sporhase decision does not represent the last word on water exports law. 
That legal issue will continue to be developed through additional state legis-
lation and litigation. There is little need to immediately enact legislation 
either promoting exports or limiting them to protect Nebraska's interests, 
but this would send a political signal that Nebraska is friendly or hostile 
toward exporting its water. Citizens and policy makers must avoid simply , 
concluding that water exports and transfers are either terrible or the solution 
to all our problems. The truth lies between these extremes. 
Background 
While the issue of water exports and transfers appears to have been 
thrust upon Nebraskans with the Sporhase decision, additional factors have 
contributed to the development of the issue and how it will affect 
Nebraskans. Nebraska's abundance of groundwater means that the state is a 
potential source of water for more arid states. Nebraska already has a 
turbulent history regarding interbasin surface water transfers that may make 
the issue of interstate water transfers more controversial. Finally, because 
Nebraska is the only western state that prohibits the sale of irrigation water 
rights for uses other than irrigation, proposals to sell water rights within 
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Nebraska and to users in other states will generate strong political 
resistance. 
Water Use and Policy 
How water exports and water rights transfers affect Nebraska depends 
upon the state's current water availability and use. While Nebraska is a semi-
arid state, its groundwater availability has created unique water laws and 
policy development and has made the state a potential source of water for 
other states. Nebraska's water policies have emphasized water development 
and use rather than resource protection. Policies encouraging water exports 
would be consistent with this tradition, although export policies have been 
vigorously opposed by agricultural groups. Policies adopting a resource 
protcction objective would discourage water exports, but they have also been 
opposed in other contexts by irrigation and water development interests. 
Sources and Use 
Nebraska is categorized as a semiarid state because the western two-
thirds of the state needs supplemental water for row-crop production. About 
90 percent of all water used in Nebraska is used for irrigation. Average 
annual precipitation ranges from thirty-four inches in the southeast corner 
of Nebraska to sixteen inches in the Panhandle. Nebraska contains thirteen 
river basins, about 24,000 miles of streams and rivers, and many small dams 
and farm ponds. Eighteen large reservoirs (each storing at least 25,000 acre-
1 
feet of water) collectively store more than three million acre-feet of water, 
principally for irrigation. Of the estimated seven million acres irrigated in 
Nebraska, approximately one million are irrigated with surface water. 
Surface water is the major source of water for power production, supplying 
all the water for hydropower generation and sixty-five percent of the water 
used for power plant cooling. Surface water is less important for other water 
uses and only provides water for approximately twenty-two percent of all 
municipal use, sev(:~nteen percent of rural domestic and livestock usc, and 
Nebraska's water policies have emphasized water 
development and use rather than resource protection. 
Policies encouraging water exports would be consistent 
with this tradition, although export policies have been 
vigorously opposed by agricultural groups. 
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twenty-seven percent of irrigation. Surface water is also used for fish and 
wildlife habitat and recreation. 
Groundwater is Nebraska's hidden treasure. Nearly three billion acre-feet 
of groundwater underlie Nebraska; more than is found in any other state and 
1,000 times the amount of water in Nebraska's large reservoirs. However 
groundwater recharge rates are very low and depend on rainfall. I~ 
Nebraska, recharge rates range from less than one inch per surface acre 
annually in regions with heavy, tighter soils to three inches per surface acre 
annually in regions with lighter, sandy soils. The three billion acre-feet of 
groundwater represent thousands of years of recharge from rainfall. 
Groundwater is widely available in Nebraska: Irrigation wells are located in 
every county and reliable domestic wells exist in every part of the state. 
At the same time, groundwater depletion is occurring in several parts of 
the state, notably in the Blue River Basin, Central Platte River Basin, and 
Republican River Basin, all intensively irrigated areas that rely on 
groundwater. Groundwater pollution is a recent problem, with nitrates and 
other agricultural chemicals being detected in most irrigated areas of the 
state (Exner and Spalding 1987). Groundwater accounts for seventy-eight 
percent of all municipal water use, eighty-three percent of rural domestic 
and livestock use, all self-supplied industrial uses, and seventy-three percent 
of irrigation use. Groundwater also supports the flow of many Nebraska 
streams and lakes during dry periods. 
Many Nebraskans, particularly farmers, think of Nebraska as being a 
relatively dry state because of its recurring droughts and low precipitation. In 
fact the state is water rich, particularly compared to other western states. 
Nebraska has streamflow, particularly from the Sandhills, that would make 
any other western state envious. Groundwater, however, accounts for most 
of the water for virtually every water use. Nebraska's groundwater resources 
are without parallel in the United States, both in quantity and quality. This 
underground treasure represents an abundant resource for instate use, a 
resource most citizens believe should be carefully guarded against potential 
exploitation by out-of-state users. 
Surface Water Laws and Issues. Nebraska is one of the seventeen arid 
and semiarid western states to adopt statutory laws governing the use of sur-
face water. In Nebraska, appropriation permits (water rights) must be 
obtained from the Nebraska Department of Water Resources (DWR) to 
secure the legal right to divert water from a lake or stream. Similar permits 
must be obtained to construct and to operate surface water reservoirs. 
These surface water appropriations are administered by the DWR on the 
basis that "first in time is first in right." This means that when water is 
insufficient to supply the needs of all appropriators, those with the most 
recent priority dates (those who acquired their appropriations most recently) 
Selling Nebraska's Water 
- The protection of environmental water uses (such as 
for fish and wildlife) and the funding of new surface 
water development projects are the most visible 
surface water policy issues facing Nebraskans. 
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must stop withdrawing water until the needs of senior appropriators have 
been satisfied. The DWR issues closing orders to junior appropriators 
virtually every irrigation season. 
Thc prior appropriation doctrine protects the rights of first users at the 
expense of later users. The most senior water rights represent the most 
secure water supply. This so-called rule of priority is an essential feature of 
the appropriation doctrine, applied by all western states to surface water and 
by most western states (excluding Nebraska) to groundwater. 
The protection of environmental water uses (such as for fish and wildlife) 
and the funding of new surface water development projects are the most 
visible surface water policy issues facing Nebraskans. Traditionally, Nebraska 
surface water laws have not recognized instream flows (water rights to leave 
water in a stream for fish and wildlife protection rather than to divert the 
water from the stream for irrigation) as a legally protected water use. 
Controversial legislation authorizing instream flow appropriations for fish 
and wildlife protection was finally enacted in 1984, but only after a bitter 
fight between environmental and irrigation interests (Aiken 1987). Further 
irrigation-environmental disputes have prevented instream appropriations 
from being granted. 
Instream flows for fISh and wildlife purposes often conflict with new 
irrigation projects. Federal funding for those projects has diminished 
substantially, raising the possibility that any major water projects in 
Nebraska will have to depend on state financing. This would constitute a 
major water policy change, requiring both a constitutional amendment to 
allow the state to incur debt to finance water projects and a political con-
sensus that new water projects are needed and can be developed without 
disrupting the environment. 
Interbasin Transfers. Interbasin water transfers represent a specific area 
of Nebraska's surface water laws and policies, especially water exports and 
water-right sales. Nebraska water right statutes were interpreted by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court in 1936 as prohibiting the transfer of water from 
one river basin to another (Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power & 
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Irrigation District, 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 [1936]). This decision 
thwarted the desires of irrigators in the Blue and Republican river basins to 
divert water from the Platte River. The legislative representatives frorn 
regions south of the Platte River made several unsuccessful attempts to 
overrule the Osterman decision through legislation authorizing transbasin 
diversions. These trans basin diversion proposals were the major theme of 
several legislative sessions, from 1943 to 1953, producing bitter and divisive 
political battles, as the regions north of the Platte River opposed transbasin 
diversion and the regions to the south supported it (Oeltjen and others 
1971). 
The Osterman decision was overruled in the 1980 Little Blue I decision 
when the Nebraska Supreme Court reinterpreted Nebraska appropriation 
statutes as authorizing, not prohibiting, interbasin surface water transfers. 
Little Blue I triggered a race for Platte River water rights that is still Occur-
ring: Platte valley irrigation interests battle promoters of irrigation projects 
in the Republican and Blue river valleys and environmentalists who want to 
protect Platte River flows for fish and wildlife (Aiken 1987). 
Nebraska's surface water policies may fairly be characterized as develop_ 
ment oriented. Appropriation statutes were adopted in 1895 to legally 
encourage irrigation development. Those statutes have been little changed 
since their original adoption, although public attitudes toward resource use 
and environmental protection have changed dramatically. Water wars pitting 
irrigators against environmentalists dominate the surface water policy 
agend.'1. Nebra'ika surface water policies encourage resource use rather than 
resource protection, an attitude Nebraskans may have to change if they wish 
to protect Nebraska water resources from exportation to other states. 
Groundwater Laws and Issues. As indicated, groundwater is the major 
source of water in Nebraska and supplies most water uses except for power 
production. Nebraska does not apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to 
groundwater; it relies instead on the courts to resolve groundwater disputes 
between landowners. While this common law approach faIls short of 
comprehensive management of a vital public resource, it mirrors the 
experience of other western states with extensive groundwater supplies: 
California, Arizona, and Texa'i. In all other states, groundwater supplies are 
so limited that legislation is required to settle frequent groundwater disputes, 
just as appropriation statutes are required to handle the recurring disputes 
over surface water use. 
Groundwater supplies arc being depleted in several areas of Nebraska, 
including the Blue River basin, the Central Platte River basin, the 
Republican River basin, and the Alliance and O'Neill areas. Groundwater 
withdrawals may be reducing streamflow in the Republican River basin and 
may reduce Platte River flow during the irrigation season. Also, groundwater 
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pollution from the use of agricultural chemicals is occurring throughout the 
irrigated areas of the state and may ultimately extend to the streams such 
groundwater feeds. But, legislation giving local natural resource districts the 
option of establishing regulations to control groundwater depletion and 
pllllution from agricultural water uses generally has not led to groundwater 
controls. New groundwater quality legislation giving the Nebraska Depart-
ment of Environmental Control authority to establish special groundwater 
quality protection areas is at least a year from being implemented and several 
years from being implemented statewide (Exner and Spaulding 1987). No 
policies exist for working with surface/groundwater conflicts, although 
concerns regarding how further diversions from the Platte River will affect 
Platte valley municipal well fields are a significant element of the current 
Platte River water war. 
Nebraska groundwater policy is virtually a blank slate. An unusual 
abundance of groundwater has given Nebraska policymakers the luxury of 
avoiding difficult political decisions to protect this critical public resource. 
Nebraska groundwater policies are even less well-developed than Nebraska 
surface water policies, and they are geared less to resource protection than 
to resource development and use. Nebraskans will have to adopt new politi-
cal attitudes emphasizing resource protection rather than resource develop-
ment and use if they are to protect Nebraska water from export to other 
states. Alternatively, the extension of Nebraska's traditional attitudes of 
encouraging water development and use at the expense of resource protec-
tion is consistent with policies encouraging the export of Nebraska water to 
other states. This possibility has already been opposed by irrigation groups, 
which have sought to maintain the instate development orientation in 
Ncbra<;ka water policies. 
Water Transfers and Exports 
To understand the legal and political dimensions of the Sporhase 
decision, an understanding of water transfers and water export policies is 
needed. Western states, including Nebraska, have traditionally restricted 
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water exports pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court decisions authorizing water 
embargoes. Most western states, excluding Nebraska, have allowed the 
buying and selling of water rights principally to allow municipalities and 
industries to obtain needed water supplies from irrigators. The Sporhase 
decision has forced western states, including Nebraska, to modify their water 
export restrictions. The Sporhase decision may also force Nebraska to mOdify 
its policies regarding water right transfers. 
Water transfers refer to instate interbasin transfers of surface water and 
instate transfers of groundwater. An interbasin surface water transfer is a 
transfer from one of Nebraska's thirteen river basins to another. The move_ 
ment of surface water within a river basin is not legally considered to be a 
transfer, whercas an intcrbasin transfer is legally subject to additional 
requirements and conditions before approval of such a transfer is given. 
What legally constitutes a transfer of groundwater is not clear under 
Nebraska law. The most narrow possibility is that any groundwater pumped 
off the tract of land from which the water was withdrawn is considered a 
transfer. The broadest possibility is that all the land overlying a groundwater 
basin or aquifer is considered overlying land, which would allow groundwater 
to be transferred over large areas. Neither Ncbraska statutes nor Nebraska 
Supreme Court decisions address this issue, although groundwater transfers 
for municipal, rural domestic, and industrial purposes are authorized if a 
Department of Water Resources permit has been obtained. Thus, irrigation 
is the only major use for which groundwater transfers is not defined. 
Water exports refer to the transfer of surface or groundwater out of 
Nebraska. Water right transfers refer to the sale of water rights from one 
user to another. In the typical transaction a municipality or industry 
purchases the water rights of an irrigator and uses the water formerly used by 
the irrigator for municipal or industrial purposes. The seller loses the right 
to continue water use, while the buyer obtains the right to use water with the 
seller's relatively senior priority date. Water rights are typically purchased 
when there is little or no unappropriated water available for new municipal 
or industrial uses. Water right transfers may be instate water right sales or 
interstate (that is, export) water right sales. 
The distinction between water transfers, water exports, and water right 
sales is important because the Sporhase decision may be interpreted as 
requiring the same rules for each type of activity, whether instate or inter-
state. Currently, a state is likely to have differcnt legal rules governing water 
transfers, water exports, and water right sales. Occasionally the term water 
transfers will be used to refer collectively to instate water transfers, water 
exports, and water right sales. 
Western Water Export Policies. Western states generally have restricted 
or prohibited water exports in order to reserve water for instate uses. 
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Common restrictions have included: requiring legislative approval before an 
xport water right could be granted; requiring that the state seeking to ~port water reciprocally authorize the export of its water into other states; 
or flatly prohibiting exports. These legislative restrictions made the move-
ment of water between states difficult to accomplish. 
Resolution of Interstate Water Use Conflicts. While western states tradi-
tionally have discouraged water exports, interstate water use conflicts have 
nonetheless arisen. The typical dispute involves the diversion of water in an 
upstream state, which reduces streamflow into a downstream state. Such 
conflicts have been resolved either through interstate compacts, where states 
negotiate water use agreements, or through litigation, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court equitably apportions the disputed water between states. 
Coal Slurry Pipeline. A new element in interstate water use arose in the 
late 1970s when South Dakota announced a plan to sell 20,000 acre-feet of 
water from federal Missouri River reservoirs to the Energy Transportation 
System<;, Inc., (ETSI) coal slurry pipeline company. ETSI proposed to grind 
Wyoming coal into dust, combine the coal dust with South Dakota water, 
and pipe the resulting coal slurry to electric utilities in Arkansas. South 
Dakota received $2 million for the initial water appropriation, with subse-
quent annual payments of $3 million until major pipeline construction 
began, at which time payments would increase to $12 million per year. The 
money received from ETSI would be used to fund water development 
projects in South Dakota, including rural water system development. The 
coal slurry pipeline project was abandoned when delays resulting from 
lawsuits filed by downstream states, including Nebra<;ka, made the project 
impractical. The ETSI case was ultimately decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1988, the court ruling that ETSI had sought water use permits from 
the wrong federal agency. 
In analyzing the water sale agreement between South Dakota and ETSI, 
one fact becomes clear: South Dakota was selling ETSI more than just 
water; it was also selling its political support for the coal slurry pipeline 
The millions of dollars South Dakota would have 
received for selling water, had the pipeline been 
constructed, led some in Nebraska to perceive selling 
water as a financial opportunity, particularly 
to fund water project development. 
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project. While ETSI needed state water rights to withdraw water from the 
federal Oahe Reservoir for the pipeline, it also needed federal approval 
However, states generally do not require cash payments as a condition fo; 
issuing new water rights. The cash payments made to South Dakota repre_ 
sented compensation for state political support of a controversial water-use 
project. 
The coal slurry pipeline proposal raised many legal and policy issues 
regarding interstate water uses, most of which remain unanswered. Signifi_ 
cantly, the millions of dollars South Dakota would have received for selling 
water, had the pipeline been constructed, led some in Nebraska to perceive 
selling water as a financial opportunity, particularly to fund water project 
development. 
Nebraska Water Export Policies. Prior to the 1981 Sporhase deCision, 
Nebraska statutes required legislative approval for surface water exports and 
reciprocity for groundwater exports. Reciprocity means that the state that 
would receive Nebraska groundwater would be required to authorize the 
export of its groundwater into Nebraska. Nebraska prohibited instate inter-
basin transfers of surface water for any purpose prior to the 1980 Little Blue 
I decision, authorized instate groundwater transfers only for municipal pur-
poses, and did not authorize water right sales. Thus Nebraska law prior to 
Sporhase was very restrictive regarding the movement of water instate and 
interstate. 
Water Right Transfers 
The second major legal issue raised by Sporhase is water right transfers, 
or the buying and selling of water rights. In virtually every western state any 
entity may purchase water rights and change both the location and the pur-
pose of water use. This means the seller is selling the right to use water. 
Most water right sales are from irrigators to industries or municipalities. 
Industries and municipalities are interested in purchasing irrigation 
appropriations because water supplies have been fully appropriated (that is, 
there is no water left for allocation to new water users). And even if the 
industry or municipality acquired a new appropriation, it would be the first 
junior appropriator issued a closing order when streamflow (or groundwater 
supplies) could not meet all appropriative need.,. Therefore, industries or 
municipalities that need water purchase rights from irrigators and convert 
those water rights to municipal or industrial uses in different locations. 
Typically, irrigation water rights are purchased because more irrigation 
rights are available for purchase than any other kind. Also, the appropria-
tions with the earliest priority dates tend to be irrigation rights, and 
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appropriations with early priority dates are the most valuable because they 
represent the most secure water supply. 
Effect on Irrigation. Water rights transfers are controversial among 
irrigators, because irrigation water sales result in irrigation (and irrigators) 
being displaced by municipal and industrial water uses. Farmers and ranchers 
see their industry being diminished to satisfy the water needs of 
municipalities and industries. This concern is probably misplaced, because 
even if western municipal and industrial water uses doubled, only about ten 
percent of western irrigation water rights would need to be transferred to 
them. ThU'i, although massive purchases of water rights by municipalities and 
industries could significantly affect irrigation, they would not displace 
irrigated agriculture. 
Return Flows. Water rights transfers are also controversial because of 
the return flows issue. When water is diverted for irrigation, less than half 
the amount diverted is actually consumed in crop production. The remaining 
water returns to the stream or groundwater aquifer as return flows and is 
available for reuse by other irrigators and water users. When irrigation water 
rights are sold, only the amount of water that has been consumed in irriga-
tion can be transferred to the new use; the return flows must be maintained. 
However, local irrigators and the municipality or industry proposing to 
purchase the irrigation water rights usually disagree about the quantity of 
return flows, with the irrigators claiming higher return flows and the water 
rights purchasers claiming higher water consumption and lower return flows. 
Resolving this issue in water right transfer administrative proceedings is 
expensive (lawyers and engineers must be employed), time consuming, and 
controvcrsial. Nonetheless, water rights sales are an efficient method for 
reallocating limited water supplies as economic conditions change. 
Water Exchanges. The purchase of irrigation water rights by a 
municipality or industry needing additional water supplies is the typical water 
rights transfer setting. Another example is a water exchange, where water in 
one location is substituted for water in another location. For example, a 
municipality may construct a storage reservoir and then trade the water 
stored for water controlled by an irrigation district in another location. The 
municipality is, in effect, trading new stored water for the old irrigation 
water. Such water exchanges sometimes allow water to be acquired at a lower 
cost than would otherwise be possible. 
Water Marketing. An emerging aspect of water rights transfers is water 
marketing. Reservoirs are expensive to build and are often controversial 
because of their adverse environmental impacts. Some suggest that purchas-
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ing water rights allows new water uses to be accommodated at a lower Cost 
than would be possible with reservoir construction, and does so with virtually 
no adverse environmental impact. Those promoting water marketing seek to 
make the process for buying or leasing water rights more expeditious to 
facilitate these market transfers. 
Western State Water Rights Transfer Policies. Virtually all western 
states authorize the sale of water rights. Several western states are taking 
additional steps to make water rights transfers easier through water market_ 
ing programs. This is particularly true in states that are experiencing urban 
or industrial growth. Water marketing programs include: establishing a state 
clearinghouse for water rights sales to provide potential water rights buyers 
and sellers an opportunity to obtain information regarding water rights sales; 
adopting new procedures to streamline the water rights transfer process; and 
streamlining the sale of water rights from state and federal irrigation 
projects. A new type of professional, the water broker, has emerged as one 
who can assist municipalities and industries in buying water rights. 
Nebraska Water Rights Transfer Policies. Traditionally, Nebraska has 
been one of the few western states that does not allow water rights to be 
transferred. If a municipality or industry needs a secure water supply, it can 
usually obtain one through a well or well field in most areas of Nebraska with 
little difficulty and relatively low cost. Thus, although most streams are over-
appropriated, abundant groundwater supplies have made it unnecessary to 
reallocate water rights through market transfers to accommodate new 
municipal and industrial uses. 
In 1983, the longstanding prohIbition against selling water rights was 
modified to allow surface-water appropriations to be sold for use within the 
same river basin and for the same purpose as the original appropriation. But, 
although water rights transfers are allowed, prohibiting the purchase of 
irrigation water rights for municipal or industrial purposes severely restricts 
the water rights market in Nebraska. 
Summary. Nebraska's pre-Sporhase water export policies were similar to 
those of other states in making water exports difficult to accomplish. 
Nebraska's water rights transfer policies differ from those of other western 
states in that Nebraska statutes do not allow the buying and selling of water 
rights except within the same river basin, for the same use. This restrictive 
policy has not hampered economic development in Nebraska, as ample 
groundwater supplies are generally available throughout the state to supply 
new municipal or industrial uses. Other wcstern states do not have this 
luxury, and therefore must allow municipalities or industries to purchase 
water rights from irrigators in order to obtain water needed for economic 
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development and population growth, Water right transfers reduce the 
quantity of water used in irrigation, reducing potential agricultural produc-
tion. Administrative proceedings for approving water rights transfers are 
often expensive and controversial, as irrigators and water rights buyers 
dispute the effect of the proposed change in use on return flows. 
The Sporhase deci<;ion has forced western states, including Nebraska, to 
modify restrictive policies on water exports. Because water export is a 
politically sensitive issue, this effect of Sporhase has been controversial in the 
West. The impact of Sporhase on water rights transfers also means that in 
states where water rights can be transferred, those water rights can now be 
purchased for use out of state. In Nebraska, where water rights transfers are 
tightly restricted, more liberal water rights transfer policies could lead to 
Nebraska surface water rights being purchased for out-of-state use. 
The Sporhase Decision 
The Sporhase decision began simply, although its results would 
revolutionize western water law and politics. Mr. Sporhase owned a farm 
straddling the Nebraska-Colorado border in southwestern Nebraska and 
used a well located in Nebraska to irrigate hi<; land in both states. Legally, 
Sporhase was required to obtain a permit from the Nebraska Department of 
Water Resources to import Nebraska groundwater into Colorado. Sporhase 
did not seek a groundwater export permit, however, because he knew the 
permit would be denied on the grounds of reciprocity: the Nebraska statute 
required that Colorado allow groundwater exports from Colorado to 
Nebraska, and Colorado statutes explicitly prohibited all water exports. 
The Sporhase decision began simply, although its 
results would revolutionize western water law and politics. 
The state of Nebraska sued Sporhase for failing to obtain a groundwater 
export permit. Sporhase argued that the reciprocity provision of the export 
statute violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the 
commerce clause, courts may invalidate state legislation restricting interstate 
commerce unless the restriction is only incidental to accomplishing a 
legitimate local purpose. The state of Nebraska argued that the export 
statute was constitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that 
groundwater was publicly owned, that groundwater was not an article of 
commerce because it could not be transferred freely, and therefore 
groundwater was not subject to the commerce clause. The court also ruled 
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that Sporhase could not continue to export water into Colorado without a 
state permit, in effect requiring Sporhase to stop his interstate irrigation 
until Colorado adopted a reciprocity provision. Chief Justice KrivoSha 
dissented on the basis that the reciprocity requirement did violate the 
commerce clause. 
u.s. Supreme Court Decision 
The u.s. Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska Supreme Court decision 
in 1982, reversing earlier decisions of its own that water export bans were 
constitutional as well (Nebraska ex reI Douglas v. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 941 
[1982]). In prior decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that state 
water export bans did not violate the commerce clause, but this rule was 
discarded in Sporhase as being inconsistent with more recent court interpre_ 
tations of the commerce clause. The court ruled instead that water was an 
article of commerce, and therefore any export prohibitions were subject to 
the commerce clause. 
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated the legal test it would use to deter-
mine whether a state statute restricting interstate commerce was constitu-
tionally valid was as follows: 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes 
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend 
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted with a 
lesser impact on interstate activities (458 U.S. at 954 [1982]). 
Thus, some regulation of water exports is legally permissible, but the regu-
lation must be for a legitimate local public purpose and the effects on 
interstate commerce must be only incidental. 
The court then suggested some circumstances in which export restric-
tions might be valid. First, the court recognized that states may regulate the 
use of water in times and places of water shortage to protect public health. 
Second, the court suggested that the public ownership of groundwater in 
Nebraska may support a limited water use preference for its citizens. Unfor-
tunately, the court did not expand on this limited instate preference, so its 
meaning is unclear. Finally, the court stated that citizens' use of water saved 
through regulatory efforts (for example, to control groundwater depletion) 
may be preferred during times of shortage. The court stated that three parts 
of Nebraska's export statutes met these standards. These requirements were 
that the proposed export of groundwater was reasonable, not contrary to the 
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conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the 
public welfare. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while some restrictions on 
exports might be consistent with the commerce clause, the Nebraska 
reciprocity requirement could not be justified legally unless Nebraska could 
demonstrate that: (1) the state as a whole suffered a water shortage; (2) 
instate water transfers from areas of abundance to areas of shortage were 
feasible without regard to distance; and (3) water imports from adjoining 
states would compensate for water exports to those states. Nebraska made 
nO attempt to argue that this was the case, and therefore the reciprocity 
clause was invalidated. 
The court further suggested that an arid state might be able to legally 
justify a ban on all exports if it could demonstrate that all water resources 
were needed for instatc usc, although the court also declared that states can-
not practice economic protectionism in making water allocation decisions. 
Finally, thc court determined that any restrictions a state imposes on instate 
water uses may also be extended to water exports, such as controls to prevent 
groundwater depletion. 
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented on the basis that Nebraska 
law does not allow transfer of groundwater to adjoining land for irrigation 
purposes, and, therefore, that the reciprocity clause did not result in 
different treatment of export uses and instate uses in this case. However, that 
was an incorrect legal premise. While Nebraska court decisions on this point 
are not dear, the Upper Republican Natural Resources District, within 
which Sporhase's well was located, did and continues to allow irrigation 
transfers to adjoining land with NRD approval as part of its local 
groundwater control regulations. 
After the Sporhase decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the 
remainder of the export permit statute was still in force, although the 
reciprocity provision had been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. 
Sporhase obtained a groundwater export permit from the Nebra.,ka Depart-
ment of Water Resources and i., irrigating his Colorado field from his 
Nebra<;ka well. 
In response to Sporhase, the Ncbraska Unicameral in 1984 amended the 
export statute to require the DWR director to consider in each export case: 
• Whcther the proposed groundwater export is a beneficial use of 
groundwater, 
• lbe alternative surface or groundwater supplies available to the 
applicant, 
• Any negative impacts of the export on local surface or groundwater 
supplies to meet reasonable future local water demands, and 
• Any other factors to protect the interest of Nebraska and its citizens. 
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In addition, the groundwater export must comply with local natural resource 
district groundwater regulations. 
Commentary 
The purposes of the commerce clause were best expressed by Justice 
Robert Jackson in 1949: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and eve'1' 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free aCCess 
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and 
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise every COn-
sumer may look to free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect 
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the 
doctrine of this Court which has given it reality (H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond 
336 U.S. 535 [1949]). ' 
The purpose of the commerce clause, then, is to ensure that states do not 
embargo, unfairly tax, or otherwise discriminate against the products of 
other states to protect instate producers. 
Under a literal reading of Sporhase, the state could not 
limit or prohibit the export unless the restrictions or 
prohibitions applied to similar instate uses, were the 
result of local water shortages, or fell within the 
u.s. Supreme Court's undefined "limited instate preference." 
In the water rights context, the commerce clause seems to require states 
allowing water or water rights to be bought and sold within a state to allow 
them to be bought and sold across state lines on the same basis. If the 
Sporhase decision were so limited, it would still have a major impact on west· 
ern water rights but a lesser impact on Nebraska, where water rights 
generally cannot be transferred. However, the U.S. Supreme Court went 
beyond this and ruled that when a state is making an initial water allocation 
(that is, initially granting the water right), it cannot discriminate economi· 
cally against out-of-state water users. This part of the Sporhase decision 
seems to extend beyond the requirements of a strict reading of the commerce 
clause. 
The principal disadvantage of the Sporhase decision is that it gives faster 
developing states an advantage over slower developing states. For example, a 
growing city may seek additional water supplies from a neighboring state to 
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upply an expanding population and economy. Prior to Sporhase, the neigh-~oring state could have prohibited or limited the water export, reserving the 
water for use by its future expanding population and economy. Under a 
literal reading of Sporhase, however, the state could not limit or prohibit the 
export unless the restrictions or prohibitions applied to similar instate uses, 
were the result of local water shortages, or fell within the U.S. Supreme 
Court's undefined "limited instate preference." 
The New Mexico Response 
The only further court interpretation of the Sporhase decision involves 
efforts of EI Paso, Texas, to import water from New Mexico. New Mexico's 
original water export statute was invalidated on the basis of Sporhase, but 
new export legislation was sustained as meeting the Sporhase requirements. 
New Mexico has gone further than any other state in attempting to comply 
with the Sporhase decision. An examination of the New Mexico experience is 
worthwhile in evaluating Nebraska's water export policy alternatives. 
El Paso I. EI Paso determined that it needed additional water supplies to 
meet the needs of a growing population, and it applied in 1980 for water 
appropriations to install 326 wells in New Mexico to annually withdraw 
2%,000 acre-feet of groundwater. The appropriations were initially denied 
by the New Mexico state engineer, based on New Mexico's statutory 
groundwater export prohibition. EI Paso appealed that decision in federal 
court, arguing that New Mexico's water export prohibition was unconstitu-
tional. 
After the Sporhase decision was handed down, the federal district judge 
ruled in El Paso I that the New Mexico water export prohibition statute was 
unconstitutional, as it interfered with interstate commerce (EI Paso v. 
Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379 [1983]). The court noted that while New Mexico 
had long been engaged in state regulatory efforts to manage and conserve 
groundwater supplies (regulations much more stringent than those found in 
Nebraska), that alone was not sufficient to justify the export prolnl>ition. 
The court ruled that Sporhase allowed a state to discriminate in favor of its 
citizens in water allocation only to the extent necessary to protect human 
health and safety needs; beyond that, water must be treated as any other 
natural resource. New Mexico did not argue that its embargo was necessary 
to protect human health and safety but rather that its purpose was to make 
maximum beneficial use of the water in New Mexico. Despite the fact that 
state water officials projected a significant statewide water shortage by 2020, 
the court noted that the uses contributing to the deficit included industry, 
irrigation, energy production, fish and wildlife, and recreation, and 
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determined that water could not be reserved for these purposes beyond the 
state's health and safety needs. 
The court suggested that New Mexico could engage in water planning 
and that export uses could be regulated on the same basis as instate USes. 
New Mexico could condition export permits with reporting or other require_ 
ments to determine whether the water was being used properly. The COUrt 
stated that if EI Paso violated any permit conditions, New Mexico COuld 
revoke the export permits and shut down EI Paso's well field. 
Among the difficulties with El Paso I are the ambiguities inherent in 
Sporhase. Parts of the Sporhase decision seem to indicate that states may 
favor their citizens in water allocation decisions only to protect water uses 
necessary for human health and safety, but not for economic development. 
Other passages of Sporhase, however, suggest that states may engage in a 
limited preference for instate water uses; but these passages do not define 
what this limited preference encompasses. The strictest interpretation of the 
limited-preferences language was adopted by the El Paso I court to mean a 
preference limited to human health and safety needs but not economic 
development. However, the limited preference language could also mean a 
limited preference for instate economic development. Commentators have 
criticized El Paso I for interpreting the limited preference language so 
narrowly (Trelcase 1987; Liepas 1984). 
Sporhase at least admits the possibility that a state may economically 
discriminate in favor of local economic development, so long as that 
discrimination does not unduly burden interstate commerce. This could 
include considering the economic benefits to the state of proposed uses and 
authorizing only those uses resulting in a net state economic benefit. Water 
exports would have few economic benefits in the exporting state and there-
fore would be expected to fail such an economic benefits test. The extent of 
this type of limited preference has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, 
although the federal district court did acknowledge its existence in El Paso II. 
SB 295 and the Export Study Commission. After El Paso I, the 1983 
New Mexico legislature enacted Senate Bill (SB) 295, which incorporated 
the features of Nebraska's export statutes found permissible in Sporhase. 
Specifically, in considering surface or groundwater export appropriation 
applications, the New Mexico state engineer could grant the permit only if 
the proposed export would not: 
• Impair existing rights, 
• Be contrary to the conservation of water within the state, or 
• Be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of New Mexico 
citizens. 
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In making these determinations the state engineer's considerations were 
specified to include: 
• The availability of water in New Mexico, 
• Demands for water in New Mexico, 
• New Mexico water shortages, 
• Whether the water proposed to be exported could be transferred to 
alleviate shortages in New Mexico, 
• Alternative water supplies available to the applicant, and 
• The demands placed on the applicant'S local water sources. 
In 1983, the New Mexico legislature also established a water law study 
committee to make recommendations regarding water exports law and 
policy. The committee presented its report to the legislature January 1, 1984. 
The committee report noted that New Mexico was facing a water shortage, 
but that surrounding states (Texas, Arizona, Colorado and Oklahoma) were 
facing much greater water shortages. Thus, New Mexico likely would have to 
contend with export requests from these states. The committee recom-
mended several alternatives: 
• Requcst federal legislation giving states the legal authority to restrict 
exports (essentially repealing Sporhase), 
• Enter into an interstate compact with Texas to apportion New 
Mexico's groundwater between the two states, 
• Study the possibility of New Mexico's appropriating all unappro-
priated water to itself in order to make the water unavailable for 
export, or 
• Enact a five-year moratorium on groundwater appropriations to study 
the available supply and provide a basis for better groundwater 
management. 
Based on the study commission's recommendations, another statute was 
enacted in 1984 establishing a two-year moratorium on groundwater 
appropriations from the aquifer in which El Paso was interested. The 
moratorium would provide time to develop additional information regarding 
the groundwater supplies, thus permitting a better evaluation of the impact 
of the proposed export appropriations. 
El Paso n. El Paso challenged the constitutionality of the revised New 
Mexico groundwater export statute and moratorium statute in federal court. 
In El Paso 1I, the court ruled that the state engineer's consideration of the 
welfare of New Mexico's citizens in evaluating water exports was not 
inherently discriminatory (El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F.Supp. 694 [1984]). 
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Citing Sporhase, the court declared that states could not limit exports merel 
to protect local economic interests, although the health of a state's economY 
has a direct bearing on its public welfare. However, the court further stat~ 
that in Sporhase the U.S. Supreme Court did not equate health and safe 
requirements with the public welfare. This suggests that there may be somty 
latitude to protect instate water uses other than simply protecting pUbUe 
health and safety on the one hand and blatant discrimination in favor of loca~ 
economic water uses on the other. 
The court also suggested that a state need not wait until water shortages 
have occurred to begin conservation efforts. An export statute could take 
potential shortages into account and be constitutional. The real test would 
be whether the administrative application of that statute by the state 
engineer was constitutional. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect ofEl Paso II is that 
the court recognized that a state's limited preference 
for instate uses could extend beyond health 
and safety considerations. 
The court then considered the groundwater appropriation moratorium 
and concluded that it applied only to the groundwater basins for which EI 
Paso was seeking export appropriations. The court also concluded that the 
purpose of the moratorium was to block those export appropriations rather 
than to gather information to improve groundwater administration. Accord-
ingly, the court invalidated the moratorium as interfering with interstate 
commerce. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of El Paso II is that the court recog-
nized that a state's limited preference for instate uses could extend beyond 
health and safety considerations. The court did not recognize this in El Paso 
I. El Paso II also warns that actions taken to prevent water from being 
exported will be closely scrutinized to determine whether they comply with 
Sporhase, and will be invalidated if they have no justification other than 
protectionism. 
After El Paso II, the New Mexico state engineer considered the EI Paso 
export appropriation application. On December 28, 1987, the state engineer 
denied the application on the basis that EI Paso did not have a need for the 
water within the next forty years. EI Paso has appealed this ruling to federal 
court, where the case is now pending. 
II ' g "'ebraska's Water Se 10 1" 
The Nebraska Response 
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The immediate reaction in Nebraska to the 1982 Sporhase decision was to 
dify the groundwater export statutes to give the director of the Depart-
1110 nt of Water Resources greater discretion in making groundwater export l11~mit decisions. A more controversial response came in the 1987 legislative 
~:ssion, when two bills were introduced to study water exports and to 
uthorize the state to encourage water transfers, water rights transfers, and 
:ater exports. These bills were controversial and were opposed by agri-
, ultural and environmental groups alike. As a compromise, the export study 
C rovisions were enacted and the more controversial water transfer and sale ~rovisions dropped. The water transfers study will propose legislation to the 
1989 Unicameral on how best to implement the more controversial features 
of the original water transfer and sale bill. 
LB 146 and LB 151. In 1987, two water transfer and exports bills were 
sponsored by Senator Loran Schmit, chairman of the Unicameral's 
Committee on Natural Resources and leading water resources senator in the 
Unicameral. The first bill, Legislative Bill (LB) 146, would have: 
• Directed the Nebraska Water Management Board, an interagency 
board responsible for reviewing and promoting large water projects in 
Nebraska, to identify and pursue water projects involving instate 
water transfers, water exports, instate water rights sales, and export 
water rights sales. 
• Directed the board to prepare a study of water sales, water rights 
transfers, interbasin transfers, and exports for legislative considera-
tion. The study was to: 
- Identify potential sources of water and water rights for transfer and 
export; 
- Identify potential buyers and markets for Nebraska's water; and 
- Suggest alternatives for handling damages resulting from water 
sales, interbasin transfers, water rights transfers, and exports. 
• Made surface water rights freely transferable between river basins and 
among uses, including instream uses. (Currently surface water 
appropriations may not be transferred between river basins or among 
different uses.) 
• Repealed the requirement of legislative approval for surface water 
export appropriations and replaced it with considerations similar to 
those added to the groundwater export statute. Surface water export 
